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Abstract 
Whilst in recent years the sociology of sport has taken to heart vociferous calls ‘to bring 
the body back in’ to analyses of sporting activity, the ‘promise of phenomenology’ 
signalled by Kerry and Armour (2000), remains under-realised with regard to sporting 
embodiment. Surprisingly, given the focus of study, relatively few accounts are truly 
grounded in the corporeal realities of the lived, sensuous sporting body. Phenomenology 
offers us a powerful framework for such analysis and has been adopted and utilised in 
very different ways by different social science disciplines. The purpose of this paper is to 
consider how existential phenomenology in particular might be utilised in the study of 
sport and physical activity, and we draw upon data from a collaborative autoethnographic 
project on distance running to illustrate this. The use of existential phenomenology and 
autophenomenography offers, we contend, fresh insights in portraying the ‘essences’, 
sensuosity, corporeal immediacy and richly-textured experiences of sporting 
embodiment.  
 
Keywords: Existential Phenomenology, Sporting Embodiment, Merleau-Ponty, 
Autophenomenography, Autoethnography 
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The Essence of Sporting Embodiment: Phenomenological Analyses of the 
Sporting Body 
 
Whilst in recent years sport studies have addressed calls ‘to bring the body back 
in’ to analyses of sporting activity, surprisingly, the ‘promise of phenomenology’ (Kerry 
and Armour, 2000), remains under-realised with regard to sporting embodiment. The 
sporting body has been studied in a myriad of different ways over the past twenty-five 
years within the social sciences, from reflections on the place of the sporting body 
generally (Theberge, 1991), through an array of feminist analyses (Hall, 1996; Markula, 
2003; George, 2005) and accounts of the gendered sporting body (Markula, 2005; 
Shilling and Bunsell, 2009), the ‘impaired’ sporting body (Smith, 2008; Sparkes and 
Smith, 2009), bodies in specific sports and physical activities (Markula, 1995; Aoki, 1996; 
Lewis, 2000; Allen Ness, 2004), and ‘ethnicised’ bodies in sport and exercise 
(Hargreaves, 2007),  to accounts of the injured and suffering sporting body (Howe, 2004; 
Allen-Collinson, 2005; Hockey 2005), and on to the maturing sporting body (Tulle, 2003; 
Wainright and Turner, 2006; Phoenix and Sparkes, 2009).   
 It can still be argued, however, that despite this growing corpus, the body has 
primarily been addressed at somewhat of an abstract, and, ironically, a disembodied 
level.  Little of the research literature appears to be firmly grounded in the carnal realities 
of the lived, breathing, sweating sporting body, as has been noted (Wainwright and 
Turner, 2003; Ford and Brown, 2005; Hargreaves and Vertinsky, 2007). We are still, it 
seems, lacking a more ‘enfleshed’ epistemology and ontology (Spry, 2001). 
Phenomenology offers one means, amongs others, of providing a lived-body, corporeal, 
highly textured and sensuously grounded analysis of sport.  Social scientific studies of the 
sporting body using the theoretical resources of phenomenology remain relatively scant, 
however, as Kerry and Armour (2000) found when reviewing the literature. 
 Nevertheless, there exists a small but  developing literature, including for example, 
Young’s (1980, 1998) existentialist-phenomenological account of ‘throwing like a girl’,  
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Rail’s (1992) study of women’s basketball, Fahlberg et al (1992) on exercise behaviour, 
Dale (1996) on the athlete’s experience, together with elements of Wacquant’s (2004) 
study of boxing, and of Shilling and Bunsen’s (2009) analysis of female bodybuilding.  
Masciotra et al (2001) provide a phenomenologically-grounded account of spatio-
temporal ‘distancing’ and co-ordination in Karate.  The dialectical relationship between 
‘player-body-subject’ and the lived-space of the playing field has been portrayed in 
relation to football (soccer), and the ‘silky touch’ aesthetics of star players (Hughson and 
Inglis, 2002; Hemphill, 2005).  Studies of mind-body practices and physical cultures 
using a Merleau-Pontian perspective include Morley’s (2001) interpretation of yoga 
practice and breath control. McDonald (2007) examines kalarippayattu, a traditional 
martial art requiring spiritual as well as physical training, drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s 
conceptualization of embodied consciousness and being-in-the-world. Addressing sports 
and physical activity more generally, Hockey and Allen-Collinson (2007) consider the role 
of sense perceptions in participants’ experiences of sport and exercise utilising insights 
from Merleau-Ponty’s work on the body as subject of perception. 
 
 This paper contributes to a small but growing literature on phenomenological 
analyses of sport. Here, our purpose is primarily to sketch out some of the distinctive 
features of a phenomenology of sporting embodiment.  In order to give a flavour of what 
phenomenological perspectives might offer we give examples of data drawn from an 
autoethnographic research project on distance running.  The account is structured as 
follows.  First we tease out from the ‘tangled web’ (Ehrich, 1999) of phenomenology the 
specific strand of existentialist phenomenology, focusing on the work of one of its key 
proponents, Maurice Merleau-Ponty.  We describe the research project from which the 
illustrative data are drawn. Subsequently, we examine the phenomenological method, 
including some of its key characteristics, and how it might contribute new perspectives to 
sporting analysis, illustrating this with data drawn from the project.  The potential of 
autophenomenography as a research approach is also considered. 
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Phenomenology: philosophical groundings 
 Phenomenology, derived from the Greek ‘phainomenon’, is the study of phenomena, 
things as they present themselves to, and are perceived in consciousness.  Kvale (1996: 
53) describes it as an approach: ‘interested in elucidating both that which appears and 
the manner in which it appears. It studies the subjects’ perspectives of their world; their 
essential meanings’. The concern with subjectivity and first-person accounts has at times, 
however, resulted in the conflation of phenomenology with qualitative research in 
general, as discussed below.  Such conflation fails to acknowledge the distinctive 
philosophical roots and ethos of phenomenology, described by some as the major 
philosophical movement of the twentieth century (Embree and Mohanty, 1997: 1). 
Emerging from the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), modern phenomenology now 
spans a wide-ranging, multi-stranded perspective, and forms of phenomenology have 
been taken up and utilised in a myriad of ways by different disciplines and subjects.   It 
was originally developed as a philosophical stance by Husserl (2002, 1931) in an attempt 
to remedy the inadequacies of ‘scientific’, ‘objective’ approaches to studying the nature of 
human existence by addressing the subjectivity of human experience. Embree and 
Mohanty (1997) posit four specific tendencies within the phenomenology movement: 
realist, constitutive, existentialist and hermeneutic; it is primarily existentialist 
phenomenology that will be considered here in addressing sporting embodiment. 
In general, phenomenology seeks highly detailed and textured, in-depth, first-
person descriptions of human experiences in specific contexts, and aspires to reveal their 
‘essences’ (described below); the essential, but always situated, structures of experience 
as they appear to consciousness. With its transcendence of Cartesian dualism and an 
emphasis on the mind-body-world nexus, phenomenology examines ‘the here and now of 
bodily existence and presence’ (Münch, 1994: 151).  Existentialist forms in particular 
acknowledge the centrality of the body in the relationship between our consciousness, 
self and world.  Whilst departing from its original ‘pure’ Husserlian form, more 
contemporary ‘sociologised’ or forms of phenomenology incorporate and develop insights 
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from other theoretical frameworks such as feminism (e.g. Butler, 1997) and critical 
sociology (Hughson and Inglis, 2002).  ?????? 
Existentialist phenomenology  
At a general level, existentialist philosophies centre upon the quest for 
understanding of human existence, posing questions such as what it means to be human, 
and whether such a thing as ‘human nature’ exists. Offering a ‘third way’ 
epistemologically and ontologically, existentialist phenomenology starts out not from the 
assumption of an ‘objective’ world outside of us, nor from a pure constituting 
consciousness, but from a dialogic relationship where world, body and consciousness are 
all fundamentally intertwined, inter-relating and mutually influencing. For key writers 
such as de Beauvoir (1972) and Merleau-Ponty (2001), our own body (le corps propre) is, 
the subject of perception, the standpoint from which all things are perceived and 
experienced; this is clearly an apposite concept within studies of sporting embodiment, 
where sense perception is often so critical.   
For Merleau-Ponty (1963: 125) our ‘being-in-the-world’  is based on the union of 
the ‘psychic’ and the ‘physiological’. In his later work, Merleau-Ponty (1969) recasts the 
‘lived body’ of his earlier writings as ‘chair’ (flesh) in order better ‘to capture its 
primordial or elemental character’ (Morley, 2001: 75), and to overcome what he 
perceived as his earlier imprisonment in mind/body dualism.  ‘Being in the world’ thus 
becomes ‘flesh-of-the-world’, to convey the fundamental continuity and inter-relatedness 
of body-mind-world.  Existentialist phenomenology also highlights the ‘situatedness’ of 
human experience, including gendered experience and behaviour (Young, 1980).  
Although some existential phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty can be accused of 
tacitly taking the male (white) body as norm, other more ‘social’ forms, such as de 
Beauvoir’s (1972), and contemporary feminist phenomenology (Fisher, 2000) explicitly 
acknowledge human experience to be structurally, culturally and historically-located.   
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In relation to studies of sporting embodiment, existentialist phenomenology’s 
focus upon inter-embodiment, in Merleau-Ponty’s (1969) terminology, ‘intercorporeality’, 
is also important.  For it is argued that the experience of embodiment is ‘never a private 
affair, but is always already mediated by our continual interactions with other human and 
non-human bodies’ (Weiss, 1999: 5).  Merleau-Ponty’s (1969) focus upon the sensory 
dimensions of embodiment and his concept of reversibility also have high applicability to 
the domain of sporting experience (Hockey and Allen-Collinson, 2007).  Reversibility 
refers to the notion that our sense perceptions are reversible: we both touch and are 
touched, see and are seen, and so on.  So Merleau-Ponty (2001: 93) suggests that the 
experience of touching, for example, cannot be understood without reference to the 
possibility of situational reversal.  Our embodied subjectivity inheres in our touching and 
our tangibility.  In relation to sporting embodiment, this haptic relationship pertains to 
the player’s contact with sports equipment and kit, plus the general physical terrain and 
environment (Hockey and Allen-Collinson, 2007), as well as including other people, 
animals and the social environment.  Before portraying the phenomenological method in 
general, we now give details of the autoethnographic project from which our illustrative 
data are extracted. 
The running research 
The approach adopted for this project on injured runners was autoethnographic 
(Reed-Danahay, 1997; Ellis and Bochner, 2000).  In this case it was a collaborative 
autoethnography, undertaken by the authors as two experienced, veteran (masters) 
long-distance runners during a period of two years when we were both rehabilitating from 
long-term knee injuries.  Defined as an autobiographical genre of writing and research 
(Ellis & Bochner, 2000: 739), autoethnography examines the dialectics of subjectivity and 
culture, and in general entails the detailed analysis of the researcher(s) qua member(s) 
of a social group or category, in this case the distance-running subculture.  A primary aim 
of the project was to construct an account which was personal, evocative, highly 
reflexive, but also aimed at giving analytical purchase to the autobiographical, so as 
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evocatively to portray the ethnographic field.   Each of us constructed a personal log, and 
a third collective log synthesised the salient, emergent themes, together with any 
differences in our individual perceptions and adaptation to the injury processes. The 
recording of our experiences was done via note books and micro-tape recording, 
subsequently transcribed. Creating the joint log, within which analytical themes and 
concepts were generated, was undertaken via a process somewhat akin to the constant 
comparative method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), although to a less formalized degree.  
The phenomenological method 
 Whilst all the different strands of phenomenology have their own distinctive 
elements, four key themes or qualities, derived from Husserlian phenomenology, can be 
identified as central to ‘the phenomenologcal method’.  This it should be remembered 
constitutes not merely a set of methods or techniques, but rather a distinctive and 
encompassing worldview (Weltanschauung), the phenomenological attitude itself.  We 
now briefly sketch out four key phenomenological elements: description, epochē and 
reduction, essence, and intentionality. 
  For phenomenologists, it should be emphasized, description is never merely the 
abstract writing or recording of things without reference to the researcher. Husserlian 
forms of descriptive phenomenology have as their aim to ‘go back to the things 
themselves’ (zu den sachen selbst), to describe a phenomenon by suspending as far as 
possible prior knowledge, beliefs, presuppositions and interpretations.  This is in order to 
arrive at its essential core characteristics and meanings, via a process of epochē and 
reduction.  ‘Epochē’ (from the Greek ‘to abstain, stop, or keep a distance from’) is a 
term used to denote the bracketing of taken-for-granted assumptions about a 
phenomenon, or at least researchers’ best attempts to do so.  The intention here is to 
reduce the phenomenon to its essential structures of experience, an essence or ‘eidos’ of 
an object of consciousness.   The concepts of epochē, reduction and essence should all be 
treated with caution, for as Merleau-Ponty (2001) warns, departing from Husserl’s 
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teachings, the central lesson that the reduction teaches is the impossibility of a complete 
reduction. Although standing outside of our socio-cultural frame to achieve complete 
bracketing is acknowledged to be an impossibility, nevertheless in practical research 
terms the concept of epochē is useful in encouraging the adoption of a more self-critical, 
reflexive research approach. 
 Within Husserlian phenomenology, intentionality is a key feature of consciousness.  
Further developed by Merleau-Ponty, the concept of intentionality highlights that 
consciousness is always consciousness of something.  It is thus intentional, directed or 
orientated towards something or someone: ‘Intentionality allows objects to appear as 
phenomena’ (Willig, 2008: 52).  This explains why different people perceive and 
experience the ‘same’ environment in radically different ways.  Intentionality is highly 
applicable when studying for example gendered perceptions of environments, or 
sportspeople’s ‘occupational’ perceptions of the sporting terrain upon which they perform, 
as illustrated by a fieldnote from the Running Project: 
Negotiating the gates a slope unfolds before me, and I head up it, taking a line 
between two fir trees, selecting where the grass is most even and thus better 
for maintaining momentum.  Leaning forward, shortening my stride, arms 
working. Just before the top I cut left between two bushes and my eyes focus 
directly on my feet as  I point my toes so as to minimize  the contact of my 
feet with the ground. Intently scanning what is around me, looking to avoid 
the cast-off needles routinely left by local narcotic addicts.  Down the slope 
and I avoid the central path as I know and can see the usual heaps  of dog 
crap decoration. 
Orientations shape not only how we inhabit time and space, but, as Ahmed (2007) notes, 
how we apprehend the world of shared inhabitance, to whom or what we direct our 
energy and attention. 
 For many phenomenologists, any method capable of producing deep, rich, detailed, 
textured descriptions of participants’ concrete lived experiences of phenomena has the 
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potential to generate the data for application of distinctive phenomenological analyses. To 
illustrate the phenomenological approach in relation to sporting experience, Kerry and 
Armour (2000) provide the example of glycogen depletion or ‘hitting the wall’ in distance 
running.  Whereas a physiologist would, they argue, focus upon holding constant certain 
variables whilst manipulating others in order to ascertain whether some distinctive, 
‘objective’ process is occurring in the body, a phenomenologist would endeavour to 
capture as far as possible from the accounts of participants how it actually feels to 
experience ‘the wall’, irrespective of whether it exists in any so-called ‘objective’, sense.  
Similarly, the data from the Running Project give some idea of how it feels to undertake 
‘interval training’ (repeated bouts of high intensity exercise with intermittent rest periods)  
in this case after a long period of injury: 
Yesterday started speedwork again and both noticed the difference 
immediately, not just in terms of the breathing becoming harder – more 
burning, but in terms of how our bodies’ bits moved once more pace was 
injected:  toes push ground hard, plantar fascia moaning at increased  effort,  
extra calf bulking-relaxing,  hamstrings getting bigger and smaller rapidly – 
feel their ‘snap’, Achilles tendon whipping  more. Arms driving.  All is whizzing, 
agitating, humming, drumming.  You can feel all of your body buzzing through 
the effort and extra blood flow…  Interestingly, today the areas that can be felt 
most by both of us are the adductors and hip flexors (inner thighs), they feel 
sore and tight, having been stretched in that way for the first time for ages. It 
feels good though, sort of the body remembering, or perhaps awakening itself 
to something it has done before. 
 With regard to methods then, phenomenological analysis has been applied to data 
derived from a wide spectrum of methods, from semi-structured interviews (e.g. Hiskey 
et al 2008) through to autoethnographic data (e.g. Hockey and Allen-Collinson 2007). 
Indeed, there is a burgeoning literature, particularly within psychology (Dale 1996; Willig 
2008 centred on operationalising phenomenology as a particular empirical approach. 
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Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) for example has been extensively applied 
within psychology, and health-related studies.  In IPA, semi-structured interviews and 
forms of thematic content analysis are often the favoured methods used to examine 
participants’ understandings and perceptions of a phenomenon.  These methods, 
however, have their limitations at least from a ‘stronger’ phenomenological perspective 
(see Allen-Collinson, 2009, for a critique).  
 As Gruppetta (2004) notes, phenomenology has at times been subject to heavy 
critique because most phenomenological researchers do not themselves participate in the 
processes under study, relying instead upon second-hand accounts.  Garfinkel (2002), 
whose ground-breaking perspective of ethnomethodology developed from 
phenomenology, warned that researchers should fulfil the ‘unique adequacy requirement’. 
Hence, the researcher must have some degree of familiarity with the phenomenon s/he is 
studying and be competent in its ‘production’ in specific contexts, even though s/he may 
subsequently seek to bracket such knowledge.  The use of second-hand accounts need 
not necessarily be construed as a weakness of phenomenology or IPA per se, or indeed of 
any research approach. It is, though, particularly incumbent upon phenomenological 
researchers without substantial ‘insider experiential knowledge’ of the areas they study, 
to proceed with great caution in imposing their own meanings and constructs upon the 
accounts of their ‘expert’ participants. Given that the phenomenological method seeks 
above all to understand phenomena from the perspective of those studied (Creswell, 
1998: 274), there are clear dangers in a researcher’s imposition of meanings upon 
her/his participants’ experiences. Autoethnographic phenomenology or 
autophenomenography, as it is sometimes known, (Gruppetta, 2004) is just one means 
of addressing such criticisms, and we conclude with a discussion of the possibilities 
offered by this particular approach. 
Autophenomenography 
 If an autoethnographic researcher studies a phenomenon or phenomena rather 
than a ‘cultural place’, Gruppetta (2004) argues that the appropriate term would be 
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‘autophenomenography’.  In the study reported here, both phenomena and cultural 
places were inextricably interwoven in the experience and the analysis.  Whilst 
undertaking the data collection for the Running Project, for example, it transpired that 
many of the field- and head-notes we recorded were in fact focused upon phenomena, as 
well as upon cultural/subcultural processes.   The autophenomenographic approach can 
certainly provide the rich, evocative, textured descriptions of first-person experience so 
central to the phenomenological quest to bring to life and to communicate the textures of 
the felt, lived embodied experience.  Like autoethnography, this genre fuses researcher 
and researched, with the purpose of using the researcher’s personal lived experience to 
illuminate the phenomenon under study (Ellis and Bochner, 2000).  As Sinclair (2005) 
notes too, autoethnographic approaches ‘insist on the value of stepping back from 
theorizing and finding value in subjective experience — that interpreted by the mind but 
also felt in the body’ (p. 93, our emphasis).  Thus autoethnography and 
autophenomenography invite readers into the text or representation, to ‘live’ the 
experience rather than merely to analyse it - at least at a certain level, for 
phenomenology in general is always explicit about the limitations of the approach fully to 
‘capture’ any aspect of lived reality. 
 Authors using autoethnography within sports studies (e.g. Allen-Collinson and 
Hockey, 2001, Sparkes, 2003) often depart from more orthodox, ‘author-absent’ 
accounts of sporting  embodiment, by constructing forms of narrative that seek to portray 
in a first-person, evocative-analytic fashion the lived-body sporting experience. Although 
little of this corpus formally applies phenomenological theory or method to 
autoethnographic data, the potential for phenomenological analysis is clearly discernible, 
particularly in relation to highly embodied and situated experiences such as this extract 
from the Running Project data: 
A bad run all over me today. Not enough fluid. Along the back end of the park 
I can tell J. is looking at me anxiously from alongside. Drive the quads up a 
rise, legs tight, everything is getting uncoordinated, boom-boom buzzing in my 
  13 
ears, vision is getting blurred, oops! Balance going like I’m sea-sick, 
aaggggggh, bile in mouth. Spit, stumble, swear, dimly J.’s voice – ‘you ok?’. 
‘OK’ I say, and to myself ‘common John boy, get it together’. Suck in the air, 3 
miles to finish, I concentrate on each footfall, it helps ease the wobbling, not 
exactly the Olympics today.... 
 
Autophenomenography offers one possible means of generating the rich, body-ful, 
fleshy, grounded and evocative descriptions of the body in sport and exercise, 
encouraging us to bring the sweat ‘back in’, rather than to exclude it from our analyses 
(c.f. Connell, 1995).  For writing and representation are fundamental concerns within 
phenomenology. In order to bring to life the essential structures of lived experience for 
the reader, to engage in ‘the breathing of meaning’ (Van Manen, 1990: 36), the 
researcher must convey accurately, powerfully, evocatively and many would advocate 
aesthetically and poetically the phenomenon, whether via writing or re/presentational 
forms such as ethnodrama and other less ‘conventional’ forms (see Hopper et al, 2008). 
 
Concluding thoughts 
  Existentialist phenomenology seeks to provide highly textured, evocative accounts 
that locate the specifics of individual experience within broader, general structures of 
human experience.  Importantly, these accounts aim to generate a feeling of 
understanding in the reader (Todres, 2007: 9) thus linking the embodiment of 
researcher, research participant(s) and reader.  As Merleau-Ponty (2001) notes in 
relation to structures of experience, these are ‘lived’ rather than ‘known’, and 
understanding occurs at a pre-reflective and corporeal as well as at a cognitive level. 
Casey (2000: 66) similarly notes what we might come to know if we listen to the body: 
‘We may sense knowledges of experiences long forgotten by the mind but always known 
by the body before language was privileged as the sole representer…’. Conveying such 
pre- or perhaps ultra-linguistic experience will always be a challenge for any research 
approach, but perhaps phenomenology and autophenomenography can provide useful 
  14 
approaches, in addition to combining the personal, idiographic and the general, 
ethnographic.  Furthermore, phenomenology is capable, as Todres (2007) notes, of 
returning texture to structure, and creating rich descriptions that produce a feeling of 
understanding in the reader, of bodily knowing and sense-making as well as cognitive 
knowledge. An approach that can provide such ‘full-bodied’, ‘fleshful’, corporeally-
textured and sensuously-detailed descriptions would certainly provide a welcome addition 
to the pantheon of social science approaches to the study of sporting experience. The 
use of phenomenology, particularly existential phenomenology can, we contend, furnish 
fresh insights by portraying vividly and evocatively the sensuosity, corporeal immediacy 
and richly-textured nature of sports participation, and bringing alive for the reader the 
very ‘essences’ of sporting embodiment. 
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